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Abstract 
Russell‘s initial project in philosophy (1898) was to make mathematics rigorous reducing 
it to logic. Before August 1900, however, Russell‘s logic was nothing but mereology. First, 
his acquaintance with Peano‘s ideas in August 1900 led him to discard the part-whole logic 
and accept a kind of intensional predicate logic instead. Among other things, the predicate 
logic helped Russell embrace a technique of treating the paradox of infinite numbers with the 
help of a singular concept, which he called ‗denoting phrase‘. Unfortunately, a new paradox 
emerged soon: that of classes. The main contention of this paper is that Russell‘s new con-
ception only transferred the paradox of infinity from the realm of infinite numbers to that of 
class-inclusion. 
Russell‘s long-elaborated solution to his paradox developed between 1905 and 1908 was 
nothing but to set aside of some of the ideas he adopted with his turn of August 1900: (i) 
With the Theory of Descriptions, he reintroduced the complexes we are acquainted with in 
logic. In this way, he partly restored the pre-August 1900 mereology of complexes and sim-
ples. (ii) The elimination of classes, with the help of the ‗substitutional theory‘,1 and of prop-
ositions, by means of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment,
2
 completed this process.  
 
1. Russell as a Mereologist 
 In 1898, Russell abandoned his short period of adherence to the Neo-Hegelian position in 
the philosophy of mathematics and replaced it with what can be called the ‗analytic philoso-
phy of mathematics‘, substantiated by the logic of relations. To be more exact, Russell took 
his first step in this direction after reading A N Whitehead‘s A Treatise on Universal Algebra 
 
1
 Cf. Landini (1998). 
2
 Cf. Milkov (2013). 
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in March 1898.  In contrast to his philosophy of mathematics, Russell‘s logic became pre-
dominantly analytical only after he read Cantor‘s Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfal-
tigkeitslehre at the beginning of July 1899. This change is documented in the manuscript of 
‗Fundamental Ideas and Axioms of Mathematics‘ (1899), in which Russell adopted a full-
blooded mereology for the first time. Now, he claimed that the relation of ‗logical priority‘, 
understood as the relation between the whole and the part, is central in logic. 
In Russell‘s part-whole logic, the logical consequence holds between both terms and prop-
ositions. Russell maintained that ‗it is possible for simple concepts [i.e., not only proposi-
tions] to imply others‘ (1899, p. 293). In other words, at that point in time, what was later 
called the relationship of ‗ontological dependence‘ played the central place in Russell‘s logic. 
He further argued that: 
 
‗A implies B‘ cannot mean ‗A‘s truth implies B‘s truth‘; for here a simpler case of implication is 
explained by one which is more complex. ‗A implies B‘ implies ‗A‘s truth implies B‘s truth‘ and 
also implies ‗B‘s falsehood implies A‘s falsehood‘. But ‗A implies B‘ applies to A and B simply as 
propositions, and quite independently of their truth or falsehood.‘ (Ibid., p. 292) 
 
Russell‘s mereological logic had three sources: 
(i) His basic categories of whole and part were connected ‗with Boole‘s logical system‘ 
(Moore, 1993a, p. xxiii). Indeed, in dropping ‗any use of magnitude and studying objects 
defined by their laws of combination alone‘, Russell followed the spirit of Boole (see Bornet 
1995, p. 238). 
(ii) The 1899–1900 logic of Russell was inspired by G. E. Moore‘s Relational Theory of 
Judgment, as stated in Moore‘s paper ‗The Nature of Judgment‘ (1899). It maintained that 
‗all concepts of a proposition are to be regarded at the same logical and ontological level, 
together with the ―external‖ relations joining them, which must be seen as terms as real as the 
rest‘ (Rodríguez-Consuegra 1991, p. 32). In fact, this single-level logic was the archetype of 
Russell‘s logical explorations at the time.3 
(iii) Another much older impulse to adopt mereology came directly from absolute ideal-
ism. Indeed, absolute idealism, both German and British, was essentially mereological. 
4
  
 
 
3
 It so happened, however, that Russell was urged two times to substantially revise it (cf. § 6).  
4
 See Milkov (1997), i, pp. 82–3. 
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2. The Turn 
In the first year of the new millennium (1900), Russell gradually adopted two novelties in 
his logic, developed in full first in the Principles of Mathematics (1903): the ‗material impli-
cation‘ and the predicate logic in the form of the theory of denoting. Both, in particular, 
changed Russell‘s methods of constructing units. 
 
2.1 Material Implication 
Besides the relationship between the part and the whole, under the continuing influence of 
Moore‘s work in philosophical logic (especially of his paper ‗Necessity‘, 1900) in the first 
few months of 1900, Russell embraced the view that there is another relationship, that of im-
plication, which holds only between propositions, not between terms. Russell soon found out 
that this relation is logically more fundamental.  
In fact, the idea of what was termed ‗material implication‘ a year later, was already articu-
lated in the manuscript ‗The Principles of Mathematics, Draft of 1899–1900‘. The material 
implication here is set out in Moorean terms: ‗Whenever A implies B, we have also the fol-
lowing propositions: A‘s truth implies B‘s truth, and B‘s falsehood implies A‘s falsehood‘ 
(1900, p. 36). However, Russell still believed that a proposition can imply a term. 
The radical and consequent turn against the part-whole logic was taken only after Russell 
became acquainted with the works of Peano. In October 1900, two months after the First In-
ternational Congress of Philosophy held in Paris where Russell met Peano, he noted: ‗I have 
been wrong in regarding Logical Calculus as having specially to do with whole and part. 
Whole is distinct from Class, and occurs nowhere in the Logical Calculus‘ (1993b, plate II). 
A few weeks later, he wrote in an article on Peano: 
 
‗It has been one of the bad effects of the analogy with ordinary Algebra that most formal logicians 
(with the exception of Frege and MacColl) have shown more interest in logical equations than in 
implication‘ (1901a, p. 353). 
 
Russell‘s argument for adopting material implication as a basic relationship in logic was 
that the part-whole relation, or the ‗logical priority of A to B [,] requires not only ―B implies 
A‖, but also ―A does not imply B‖‘ (1903, § 134). In contrast, material implication is transi-
tive. Consequently, this relation is rather simple than part-whole, and thus, more fundamental 
and more appropriate as a logical constant. 
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Be as it may, some remnants of the old mereology remained in Russell‘s logic. Thus, he 
continued to speak about logical summing of terms, and not only of propositions. By Peter 
Geach‘s account, ‗[t]o a contemporary logician the idea of a disjunction of proper names may 
well seem alien‘ (Geach 1962, p. 66). This case shows that in the second half of 1900, Rus-
sell did not embrace his new logical conception without reservation. 
The acceptance of the material implication as the simplest relation in logic, with the help 
of which all pure mathematics can be deduced (see 1903, § 1), made Russell‘s logic inten-
sional. Apparently, this turn towards intensional logic was also connected with his treatment 
of infinity, which we will discuss in the next subsection.  
 
2.2 Theory of Denoting and Predicate Logic 
In The Principles of Mathematics, Russell also formulated his Theory of Denoting (see 
1903, Ch. V) which, in fact, can be seen as nothing but his interpretation of Frege‘s technique 
of quantification. The central point of the Theory of Denoting is that there are two kinds of 
denoting: intuitive (immediate) or proper, and symbolic or improper.
5
 Things have proper 
meaning, and concepts, improper. This is the case because while things occur in a proposition 
as terms, concepts give rise to ‗classes as one‘ (or class-concepts), which are combinations of 
terms. They differ from ‗classes as many‘, which are merely aggregates of terms. In other 
words, in a class-concept, ‗one predicate occurs otherwise than as a term‘ (§ 57). More par-
ticularly, it gives rise to denoting. ‗A concept denotes when, if it occurs in a proposition, the 
proposition is not about the concept, but about the term connected in a certain peculiar way 
with the concept‘ (§ 56).6 It does not refer to the term directly, but in its interrelationship with 
other terms. In other words, Russell‘s Theory of Denoting employs what Michael Dummett 
later called ‗Frege‘s context principle‘. Typical examples of denoting concepts are phrases 
that are quantified, and in particular, phrases that contain propositional functions. 
To use Frege‘s words, denoting phrases put stress on the ‗organic connection‘ of the prop-
ositional function (or concept) with the arguments (or objects) that fall under it. Functions are 
not just aggregates (heaps) of arguments (or objects, or individuals). This explains why a 
propositional function is valid for any argument that falls under it, and a concept defines eve-
 
5
 Incidentally, Husserl had already accepted this in 1894 (see Coffa 1991, pp. 101–2). 
6
 This conception gave rise to the fruitful ontology of ways, further explored by Wittgenstein (cf. 
Milkov 2017). 
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ry object (individual) that falls under it. In contrast, both mereologists and Boolean logicians 
completely disregard the distinction between function, or concept, and argument, or individu-
al. 
Moreover, predicate logic is the logic of many-orders (types). Its ontology embraces: (i) 
the order of individuals, (ii) that of functions (class-concepts), (iii) that of classes of classes, 
etc. It is true that the first-order predicate logic did not do obvious harm. The trouble became 
visible only when Frege introduced (in ‗Function and Object‘, 1891) the notion of ‗extension 
of concepts‘ that are objects themselves. Incidentally, in this way, Frege disparaged his own 
principle that logic has radically different orders—a mistake Russell tried to eliminate with 
his Theory of Types (more about this in § 7). 
 
2.3 Theory of Denoting and the Treatment of Infinity 
Russell was especially enthusiastic about his Theory of Denoting since it introduced a new 
technique for (intensively) treating infinite collections, including infinite numbers, with the 
help of a singular concept. Here is this story in short.  
In his idealistic period, Russell, the Neo-Hegelian, was very sensitive to philosophical and 
logical paradoxes (cf. § 5). To be more exact, up to 1898, he believed that there are three par-
adoxes: of infinitesimals, of continuity, and of infinity. The latter has two forms: of actual 
infinity, and of infinite numbers.  
After his turn of 1898, he changed his mind. This change happened in three steps: 
(i) In 1898, Weierstrass convinced him to banish the infinitesimals: There is no such thing 
as the ‗next‘. There are no infinitesimal moments, places, etc.7 There are only elements of 
finite size that are ordered in different ways. 
(ii) Russell eliminated the antinomy of continuity after embracing Cantor‘s set theory in 
1899. 
(iii) Based on Cantor‘s diagonal method, he also resolved the problem of the actual infini-
ty. 
 
7
 Russell thought of logic ontologically (he would say ‗realistically‘). He was strongly convinced that 
‗logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and gen-
eral features‘ (1919, p. 169) (see § 5). 
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Russell, however, did not adopt Cantor‘s treatment of infinite ordinal and cardinal num-
bers. More precisely, he did not accept their existence. As a consequence, he still believed 
that:  
 
‗Mathematical ideas are almost all infected with one great contradiction. This is the contradiction 
of infinity. All antinomies, I believe, so far as they are valid at all, will be found reducible to the 
antinomy of infinite number‘ (1900, p. 70).  
 
Exactly at this point, Peano‘s logic helped Russell. Or rather, he tried to solve his ‗great 
contradiction‘ via Peano‘s predicate logic.  
A typical example of a denoting concept (phrase) is the infinite collection denoted by the 
concept ‗all numbers‘ (the importance of this example will be discussed in § 3).8 The point in 
question is that, having no direct connection with the referent, one denoting phrase can re-
ferin the most precise wayto many, including infinitely many, terms. In fact, one of Rus-
sell‘s reasons to introduce the denoting phrases thus understood was his endeavour to treat 
with their help infinite numbers without paradoxes.  
To be more exact, according to Russell‘s Theory of Denoting (1903), there are five possi-
ble forms of denoting, which are nothing but five different ways of referring to terms of con-
structed unities, or totalities. These are characterised by five words ‗of constant occurrence in 
daily life‘: all, every, any, a, some. (i) All means a numerical conjunction (‗Brown and Jones 
are two of Miss Smith‘s suitors‘). (ii) Every means a propositional conjunction (‗Brown and 
Jones are paying court to Miss Smith‘). (iii) Any is a variable conjunction, which is some-
thing between conjunction and disjunction (‗if it was Brown or Jones you met, it was a very 
ardent lover‘). (iv) A gives rise to the variable disjunction (‗if it was one of Miss Smith‘s 
suitors, it must have been Brown or Jones‘). (v) Some gives rise to the constant disjunction 
(‗Miss Smith will marry Brown or Jones‘).9 
 
8
 It deserves notice that already before the Paris Congress, Russell was conscious that the problem of 
totality, where all and any describe various forms of the permutations in a set, is indeed ‗intimately 
connected‘ but nevertheless different from that of the whole and part. For example, he maintained that 
‗all cannot be defined numerically‘, but it nevertheless means a perfectly specified notion. (1900, p. 
41).  
9
 This analysis of compositionality is a good example of Russell using ordinary language as a com-
pass in philosophy. Ironically enough, in the 1950s, he was strongly against this approach. 
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Of special interest are the two ways of referring to infinite unities: points ‗i‘ and ‗iv‘. As 
already mentioned, at the centre of Russell‘s argument was the claim that there are two kinds 
of constructing wholes: aggregates and units. The aggregate ‗is definite as soon as [all] its 
constituents are known‘ (1903, § 135). In contrast, the unit is intensional. In the aggregate, 
we have a ‗numerical conjunction of terms‘, while in units, we have a ‗variable disjunction‘. 
The first is a simple summative class and the second is a class-concept, or predicate, or prop-
ositional function. Russell further claimed that the unit is logically more fundamental than the 
aggregate. Indeed, it is the unit that helps resolve the paradox of infinity number.  
Two final remarks: 
 
(i) Besides aggregates and units, in The Principles of Mathematics, Russell also held 
that there is a relation between subordinate aggregates (not between an aggregate and a 
term) that can be called a relation between the whole and the part proper. This means that in 
1903, Russell did not completely disregard mereology. 
(ii) Towards the end of his study of the forms of denoting, Russell found a sixth form 
of denoting, indicated by the definite article ‗the‘. Unfortunately, he had no time to make a 
precise analysis in the Principles. He did it two years later, in his famous Theory of De-
scriptions, in the paper ‗On Denoting‘ (1905). This development, however, lies beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
 
To sum up the results we achieved in this section: Russell was fascinated with the tech-
nique of the quantification of Frege and Peano because it allegedly resolved something of 
greatest importance to him—the paradox of infinite numbers. As a consequence, he started to 
consider unities (totalities) as theoretically more important than aggregates. 
 
3. First Symptom that the Turn Produced Problems: the Paradoxes 
So far, we have found that in an attempt to escape the paradox of infinity, in The Princi-
ples of Mathematics, Russell assumed that class-concepts (propositional functions) and ob-
jects, or individuals (arguments) are radically opposite things. In this, he followed the new 
many-ordered logic of Peano, and ultimately of Frege, which embraced an opposition be-
tween class-concepts on the one hand, and individuals and terms on the other. 
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Unfortunately, as a by-product of this conception, another paradox emerged—that of clas-
ses. All this suggests, and this point shall be examined in a while, that Russell‘s Peano-
Fregean turn
10
 did not eliminate the paradox of infinity, but merely removed it from one 
realm into another—that is, from the realm of infinite classes to that of class-inclusion. 
This point did not go unnoticed by commentators. According to one of them, Gregory 
Moore, all the three paradoxes Russell tried to resolve have the same structure. These para-
doxes are: (i) that of an infinite ordinal number (discovered in July 1899), (ii) that of the larg-
est cardinal number (discovered in November 1900), and (iii) Russell‘s paradox proper (his 
paradox of classes, discovered in May 1901). Apparently, ‗this structure was presented in the 
back of his mind as a kind of template that could be unconsciously applied to Cantor‘s work 
on infinite number‘ (Moore 1995, p. 236). The rest of this section shall try to specify this 
template in more concrete terms.  
Russell was convinced that in each contradiction, ‗there is a common characteristic, which 
we may describe as self-reference or reflexiveness‘ (1908, p. 61). Again, in 1959, he wrote: 
‗in all the logical paradoxes there is a kind of reflexive self-reference which is to be con-
demned on the same ground: viz. that it includes, as a matter of totality, something referring 
to that totality which can only have a definite meaning if the totality is already fixed‘ (p. 63). 
Contrary to this conception of the unity of logical paradoxes, after the discovery of Rus-
sell‘s paradox proper, the paradox of classes, philosophers were inclined to multiply paradox-
es ad libitum. Frank Ramsey (1978, p. 171) made the decisive step in this direction, splitting 
the paradoxes up into semantic and syntactical paradox. However, as it was conclusively 
shown recently, these have one and the same structure (Priest 1994).  
The self-reference is also characteristic of Russell‘s initial paradox of infinite numbers. 
Indeed, he conceived the paradox of infinite numbers in exactly the same form: ‗There are 
 
10
 This section shall discuss ‗Russell‘s Peano-Fregean turn‘ only figuratively. In fact, until June 1902, 
Russell had practically no knowledge of Frege. There are two reasons for using this figure: (i) The 
gist of Russell‘s turn from August 1900 was the assimilation of the philosophical consequences of 
Peano‘s theory of quantification. Today, however, it is widely accepted that Frege‘s theory of quanti-
fication decisively influenced Peano‘s theory of quantification (see Gillies 1982). This partly explains 
why, after assimilating Peano‘s conception, Russell so easily embraced the ideas of Frege. (ii) Russell 
was also impressed by Peano‘s elegant symbolism, which was developed ‗partly under Frege‘s influ-
ence‘ (Moore 1998, p. 732a). 
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many numbers; therefore, there is a number of numbers. [But] If this be N, N+1 is also a 
number; therefore, there is no number of numbers‘ (1899, p. 265). In truth, this was a proto-
variant of Russell‘s paradox proper but formulated two years earlier. Apparently, the two 
paradoxes, of infinite numbers and of classes, were only two sides of this proto-paradox. 
All this explains why, when the problem of infinite numbers was ‗resolved‘ after August 
1900 by way of (Peano‘s) treating the number of numbers as a single class-concept, immedi-
ately after Russell began to work on his newly moulded pure mathematics in detail in Octo-
ber 1900, he found, in November 1900, a ‗mistake in Cantor‘ exactly on this point (the class 
of all classes). It later turned out to be the ‗new contradiction‘: Whenever a greatest cardinal 
number is accepted, the number of classes is the largest number. 
Apparently, in November 1900, Russell merely transformed the paradox of infinite ordinal 
numbers into a paradox of cardinal numbers (of the largest cardinal number). To be sure, 
‗Russell‘s antinomy of infinite number ... has precisely the same formal structure as the para-
dox of the largest cardinal‘ (Moore 1995, p. 226). Thus, ‗it was not a new discovery, but a 
shift in how he perceived an argument which he already possessed‘ (ibid., p. 231). 
Some months later, in May 1901, Russell reformulated his antinomy in terms of predicates 
not predicable of themselves, thus articulating his paradox proper.  Only in his letters to Fre-
ge from June 16, 1902, however, did he formulate it in terms of classes. Now his problem 
was: Is the class of the classes that are not members of themselves a member of itself? Rus-
sell‘s official answer was that, in fact, it is of a type different from that of the other objects. 
To eliminate the possibility of type-confusion, he introduced the ‗vicious circle principle‘, 
according to which ‗[w]hatever involves all of a collection must not be one of the collection‘ 
(1910, i, p. 37). As it shall be shown below, his real answer was rather different. 
 
4. Theoretical Source of Russell’s Paradox 
The gist of this discussion is that in treating ordered collections of any kind, paradoxes are 
unavoidable. Apparently, the problems in such cases pertain to the ‗limits to thought whose 
very notion is dialetheic‘ (Priest 1991, p. 369):11 the problem of truth (aletheia) is not rele-
vant to them. What can be done in such cases is to treat them not in an orderly fashion but 
analytically, and structurally—for example, via quantifiers. In other words, the irreversible 
 
11
 Kant called them ‗antinomies of pure reason‘. 
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order (and with this the infinity) in them can be put ‗in brackets‘; we can ‗seal it off‘ and to 
proceed the calculation further. 
Incidentally, Russell himself was conscious of the dialetheic limits of human thought. This 
is shown by the fact that the strategy he followed to resolve the problems of continuity and 
infinity was to go beyond conventional intuitions which presuppose an aletheic understanding 
of composing unities (totalities) with individuals (objects). To be more exact, following Can-
tor, he maintained that the problem of infinity can be only overcome if we banish a maxim of 
common sense:
12
 the intuition that ‗if one collection is part of another, the one which is a part 
has fewer terms than the one of which it is a part‘ (1901b, p. 373). 
Ironically, the trouble with Russell‘s paradox was that he, just like Frege, did not banish 
the conventional intuitions that led to his paradox: that we can quantify objects of any kind, 
without restriction. To be more exact, Russell failed to structuralise the notion of class-
membership. Instead, he followed the common-sense belief that the including class can com-
prise everything that falls under it. From the beginning, he rejected the idea that there can be 
subclasses that are not susceptible to class-inclusion (see §5). 
To be more specific, as it has already been mentioned (in §2.1), in ‗The Principles of 
Mathematics, Draft of 1899–1900‘ (1900), Russell adopted Cantor‘s treatment of continuity 
(which developed some of Weierstrass‘s points), according to which there are no infinitesi-
mals. The moments and places in his logical ontology were absolutely determined and finite 
(cf. n. 7). There are no intervals between them, no next moments or places. Between two 
moments (places), there are always other moments (places). Thus, ‗next‘ was the first com-
mon-sense intuition that Russell, following Cantor, banished.
13
 
This conception sees the world as an assemblage of structures. Indeed, in structures, there 
is no problem of neighbourhood; nor is there a topology of structures. This is because it is 
irrelevant where they are: they are mutually substitutive. With his turn of 1900—to be more 
exact, with the new, Peano-inspired treating of infinite numbers—Russell introduced another 
structuralist conception based on the one-many relationship. What he achieved by adopting 
 
12
 Wittgenstein put this matter in similar, yet clearly different terms. The problem of infinity is a 
product of certain (grammatical) misunderstandings, which have to be removed from the calculation 
(Wittgenstein 1956, IV, §6). 
13
 ‗The banishment of the infinitesimal has all sorts of odd consequences, to which one has to become 
gradually accustomed. For example, there is no such thing as the next moment‘ (1901b, p. 371). 
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the technique of quantification was a new technique of ‗putting‘ an infinite number into—
rather, including it in—one concept or class-concept. 
Despite his strong belief to the contrary, however, the problem of infinity was not ‗re-
solved‘. It appeared on the face of the new concept of class-inclusion. Indeed, Russell ‗re-
solved‘ the antinomy of infinite numbers but only by transforming it into the antinomy of 
class-inclusion. 
 
5. Motives for Asserting the Paradox of Classes 
Apparently, the reason why Russell stuck to the paradoxes in the philosophy of logic and 
mathematics was his ‗debt to German learning‘.14 Because of it, Russell was inclined to be-
come infatuated with insolubilia,
15
 so that when confronted with problems of this kind, he 
lost his ability to analyse—in this case, to analyse the composition of unities (totalities). His-
torians of analytic philosophy have already noticed that while Russell‘s official theory was 
that mathematics is free of paradoxes, deep in his mind, he continued to believe that mathe-
matics is paradoxical (see Garciadiego 1992, p. 152). This explains why he was so sensitive 
to any sign of paradoxes in logic and mathematics. 
Especially illuminating in this respect is the fact that it was Frege who made Russell‘s par-
adox a paradox. Indeed, as recent historical investigations reveal, ‗[t]he fact that Frege, 
whose logical work Russell admired intensely, found Russell‘s paradox devastating ... played 
a major role in convincing him of its fundamental importance‘ (Moore 1995, p. 235). Until 
Frege‘s reaction to Russell‘s problem in his historic letter of 22 June 1902, Russell‘s friends 
Couturat and Peano, as well as Whitehead, who shared most of his logical ideas, were not 
impressed with his trouble at all. This explains why, before communicating the ‗contradic-
tion‘ to Frege, Russell was uncertain ‗as to how important his paradox actually was‘ (Moore 
2013, p. xxxiii). But, why was that so?
16
 
 
14 Cf. with the title of Russell‘s paper (1955). It is important that Russell himself insisted on the na-
tionality of different schools of mathematics and logic (see, for example, 1901a).  
15
 Some authors have justly noted that ‗in a neo-Hegelian vein—he [Russell] collected as many para-
doxes as he could‘ (Grattan-Guinness 1986, p. 108). 
16
 Griffin (2004) tried to answer this question without referring to Frege. He was convinced that ‗Rus-
sell was not the first person to find a paradox in set theory, but he was the first to make a really big 
fuss about it‘ (p. 349). As just seen, however, the first to ‗make a big fuss about it‘ was Frege, not 
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First of all, both Frege and Russell were more philosophically oriented than the aforemen-
tioned logicians. The trouble with Russell, in particular, was that, as we have already men-
tioned (in n. 7), he stuck to his philosophical realism. The ontology that underlined his logic 
consisted of realistic categories such like ‗points‘ and ‗moments‘. Frege‘s problem was even 
greater. He was convinced that ‗axioms should express truths and definitions should give the 
meanings. … If the terms in the proposed axioms do not have meaning beforehand, then the 
statements cannot be true (or false), and thus they cannot be axioms‘ (Shapiro 1996, p. 161). 
And this is even more important since logic is the science of truth. 
The philosophical realism both Frege and Russell stuck to explains why they used ‗quanti-
fiers as varying over everything in the universe‘ (Moore 2013, p. xxiv). Today, we know that 
the most important lesson from the spectacular failure of Frege‘s logicist programme was that 
‗we cannot uncritically assume the existence of universal domain of quantification‘ (Simons 
2007, p. 238).
17
 Peano, for one, did not share this belief. He also did not make use of proposi-
tional functions (cf. 1903, § 22). That also explains why he was not impressed with Russell‘s 
‗contradiction‘. 
 The main point, which supports our thesis that Russell himself created his paradox, or, to 
be more accurate, that he remoulded an old paradox of his into his paradox of classes, is that, 
as already mentioned, many other logicians did not see a paradox here. Among them were 
also Stanislaw Leśniewski and Kurt Gödel. Their approach is especially telling from our per-
spective since they directed their attention to analysing Russell‘s concept of unity or totality. 
In particular, both criticised Russell‘s understanding of classes as class-concepts. 
Gödel was especially clear on this point: ‗[O]ne may, on good grounds, deny that refer-
ence to a totality necessarily implies reference to all single elements of it‘ (Gödel 1944, p. 
135). All is not necessarily an infinite logical conjunction. Indeed, we have already seen (in § 
2.3) that Russell himself enumerated five different ways of constructing unities. Oddly 
enough, though he knew these alternatives, he stuck to one—point ‗iv‘ in our notation. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Russell. This point reveals an important difference between Griffin‘s (and that of some other main-
stream historians of analytic philosophy) approach and the approach we follow in this paper. The 
former is fine-grained, going deep into formal details. Our approach, in contrast, tries to draw a more 
general logico-philosophical picture of the developments under review in order to suggest the best 
explanation. 
17
 Simons refers here to Dummett (1973, p. 455 ff). 
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Much before Gödel, however, Leśniewski had already suggested an extensive solution to 
Russell‘s paradox in 1927, pointing out that it rests on the same one-sided use of the concept 
of class. To eliminate it, Leśniewski discriminated between a collective and distributive con-
ception of class. Something is a member of a distributive class if and only if it is ipso facto 
this class.
18
 In contrast, a member of a collective class need not be ipso facto that class (see 
Leśniewski 1927–31, p. 17). Russell‘s paradox would not have emerged had he assumed that 
all classes were distributive; in this case, there is no such object as the class of classes that are 
not members of themselves. 
Of course, this was not the single possible way to face Russell‘s paradox. For example, 
David Hilbert and his acolytes in Göttingen followed an alternative direction. They (Ernst 
Zermelo, in particular) tried to ‗reform logic‘ through axiomatizing set theory (see Peckhaus 
2004, p. 510).  
 
6. Russell’s Main Trouble Inflicted by the Turn of 1900 
George Santayana had once said that Russell ‗was a failure‘. Russell‘s task was to renew 
Frances Bacon‘s project for a great instauratio magna of all sciences. Instead, he was in-
volved in exploring subjectivist epistemological problems. Hao Wang surmised that this fail-
ure was due to the harmful influence of Wittgenstein. This section will show that what occa-
sioned Russell‘s ‗failure‘ was, above all, Frege‘s influence on his logic, and not the influence 
of Wittgenstein alone. The latter simply transported Frege‘s influence to Russell.19 
Russell himself felt dissatisfied with The Principles of Mathematics upon finishing it. On 
2 August 1902, he wrote in a letter to Miss G. L. Dickinson: ‗…the proofs come occasionally, 
and seem to me very worthless; I have a poor opinion of the stuff when I think of what it 
ought to be‘ (Moore 1993b, p. xxxviii). Two and a half months before that, on 16 May, Rus-
sell wrote to his wife, Alys: ‗This is not the true artistic conscience, but that is a luxury I can 
no longer afford for the present‘ (Moore 2013, p. xxx). And three days later, he wrote: ‗…the 
final product is not a work of art, as I had hoped it would be‘ (1992, p. 234).  
So, what caused this disappointment? 
 
18
 Leśniewski borrowed the very terminology of collective and distributive classes from Tadeusz Ko-
tarbiński much later. 
19
 Cf. Milkov (2013). 
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Apparently, to Russell, the ‗beauty‘ of his initial project (1898–August 1900) came with 
the ease with which it treated different problems by way of one and the same concept—the 
concept of order, elaborated with the help of the logic of relations.
20
 The chapters of this pro-
ject were: logical order (based on implication), the order of whole and part (based on the 
extensive class-inclusion), the order of numbers, and spatial and temporal order.
21
 Organized 
this way, the work really did promise to be ‗as clear as a crystal‘.22 
This project was rooted in the one-order logic developed by Moore in 1899, which deci-
sively influenced Russell‘s project to reform logic (cf. § 1 [ii], above). It was also closely 
connected with the method of reductive analysis, which can be especially well embedded in a 
kind of part-whole logic. 
In contrast, Frege‘s philosophical logic assumed a deep, many-ordered, intentional logic 
that is fruitful, and in which the function is organically connected to all individuals who fall 
under it and so determines them.
23
 It persuaded Russell to assume that logical terms are het-
eromorphic, divided into strata: terms, propositions, functions, propositional functions, and 
classes (terms and denoting phrases). This was the first lesson in logic Russell learned from 
Frege (cf. § 2.3). 
This lesson had grave consequences for both Russell‘s logic and philosophy. As it can be 
seen in the next section (§ 7), between 1903 and 1910, Russell tried to mitigate the damages 
it induced in his programme of analysis. It also deserves notice at this point that, as it has 
been shown elsewhere (Milkov 2013), a ‗second lesson‘ in the logic of Frege that Russell 
learned through Wittgenstein in 1913 urged him to further revise his philosophy and logic.  
In Russell‘s defence, it can be mentioned that he took this turn with hesitation, making 
many efforts to evade those elements in it that were alien to his authentic, extensional logical 
intuitions. As a result, his ‗logic remained of a quite different character from [Frege‘s]‘ (Grat-
tan-Guinness 1988, p. 77b).
24
  
 
20
 Hager (1994) partly supports this view. 
21
 In accepting the concept of order as central to his logic, Russell followed—directly or indirectly—
Hermann Lotze (cf. Milkov 2008). 
22
 This was Wittgenstein‘s judgment on his Tractatus. 
23
 Milkov (2015) demonstrated that these ideas of Frege‘s logic were influenced by ideas of German 
Idealism. 
24
 A point often discussed in the newer literature (Mayer 1996, p. 135; Peregrin 2001; Beaney 2008). 
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From the point of view of the mathematical logic, Russell‘s doubts can be explained by 
the fact that with his turn of August 1900, Russell tried to synthesize two traditions in it: 
First, the algebraic line launched by De Morgan and developed further by Boole, Peirce, 
Schröder, and Whitehead. Second, the programme to improve the rigour of mathematical 
analysis laid down by Cauchy and developed further by some continental mathematicians and 
logicians like Weierstrass, Peano and Frege. ‗[T]he algebraists (like Grassman) used part-
whole theory, whereas mathematical logicians used Cantorian set theory‘ (Grattan-Guinness 
1996, p. 212). 
From the point of view of philosophical logic, there were at least two symptoms to show 
how adopting the elements of Frege‘s logic alienated Russell from his authentic direction: (i) 
‗[T]he recognition of denoting concepts was inconsistent with [Russell‘s metaphysical] mo-
nism‘ (Coffa 1991, p. 106) that was proclaimed with the acceptance of realism in 1898. In-
deed, it introduced different layers of being. (ii) The adoption of propositional function in 
1903  
 
forced to some extent the readmission of the subject-predicate pattern (by means of propositional 
functions) and, therefore, the abandonment of the relational ontology that was implicit in Moore‘s 
theory of judgment (Rodríguez-Consuegra 1993, p. 80).  
 
In contrast to Russell, Edmund Husserl, who was very well informed about the new devel-
opments in logic and mathematics, was convinced that the most important achievement in the 
logic of the fin the siècle period was the new mereology (not Frege‘s technique of quantifica-
tion, with which Husserl was well acquainted), or the logic of terms. Philosophers had to fol-
low it as well. 
 
7. Russell’s Way out—Theory of Descriptions and other Emendations 
After years of heroic efforts, Russell found some tentative solutions to his paradox. First, 
his Ramified Theory of Types set aside some philosophical assumptions in logic he and Frege 
had made which clearly contradicted their many-ordered logic: that there is a universal (one-
levelled) domain of quantification. It deserves notice, however, that Russell, even in (1919), 
was not so confident about how sound this solution was. He clearly felt that ‗the theory of 
types emphatically does not belong to the finished and certain part of our subject: much of 
this theory is still inchoate, confused, and obscure‘ (p. 135). Russell simply believed in ‗the 
need of some doctrine of types‘ (ibid.). 
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Much more successful in solving his paradox was the Theory of Descriptions (1905). In 
fact, Russell felt from the very beginning that his paradox can be resolved through a correct 
theory of descriptions.
25
 Later, he remembered that after years of abortive efforts to solve the 
paradox, the first success came with his Theory of Descriptions. ‗This was, apparently, not 
connected with the contradictions, but in time an unsuspected connection emerged‘ (1959, p. 
79). 
But, what exactly was the connection between the solution of the paradoxes of self-
reference and the Theory of Descriptions? First of all, with the introduction of objects of ac-
quaintance as a legitimate part of logic, Russell also (re)introduced complexes we are ac-
quainted with into his logic. In this way, Theory of Descriptions limited the competence of 
the propositional functions, and thus partly restored the realistic mereology of complexes and 
simples, embraced in 1898, but rejected in 1900.  
Secondly, with the introduction of the concept of ‗incomplete symbols‘, Russell also made 
two other emendations to his logic, both of which were directed at eliminating the splitting of 
logic into different levels: 
(i) He first eliminated classes, and also relations, as entities. After 1905, he maintained 
that classes are only ‗incomplete symbols‘ and hence, are not objects. To be more precise, 
Russell introduced the ‗no class‘ theory in (1907, p. 45). There are no classes but also no 
propositions and no propositional functions (cf. § 4). ‗A propositional function standing alone 
may be taken to be a mere schema, a mere shell, an empty receptacle for meaning, not some-
thing already significant‘ (1919, p. 157). 
It is true that after 1907, with the introduction of the Ramified Theory of Types, Russell 
adopted a stratified language with ordered variables. But, he never spoke about orders of enti-
ties (objects) again. Only the constituents of judgements are stratified into individuals (par-
ticulars) and universals. In other words, now he maintained that there are types of classes 
(attributes), but these can be presented by only one type of variable. In other words, there is a 
hierarchy of classes but not of objects.  
 
25
 In a letter to Jourdain on 14 March 1906, Russell wrote: ‗In April 1904 I began working at the Con-
tradiction again, and continued at it, with few intermissions, till January 1905. I was throughout much 
occupied by the question of Denoting, which I thought was probably relevant, as it proved to be‘ 
(quoted according to Grattan-Guinness 1977, p. 79).  
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(ii) Also in 1907, Russell discovered that propositions and propositional functions produce 
paradoxes of their own. (Of course they do: they are unities.) In consequence, he came to 
maintain that there are no propositions. To be more exact, these were eliminated with the help 
of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment. According to it, propositions only receive 
meaning (i.e. unity) through the judging mind: ‗Propositions are incomplete symbols that 
require the context of judging mind in order to achieve a meaning.‘26 It follows that the truth-
bearers are judgements, not propositions. The ontology of Principia Mathematica is also 
based on this conception. 
As a result, in Principia Mathematica, Russell adopted a full rehabilitation of the ontology 
of the complex and simple. Both classes and propositions were declared incomplete symbols. 
With this step, the many-order logic left ontology; now it was restricted to the logical lan-
guage exclusively (see Chihara 1972, pp. 262–3). 
Incidentally, despite all the difference between their logics, at the beginning of the 1920s, 
towards the end of his days, Frege reached a similar conclusion: the only way to avoid para-
doxes in logic is to refuse to use the concept of (intensive) class as totality (or class-concept). 
The adoption of this position was supported by the acceptance of explicit geometrism in log-
ic. Frege realised that the assumption of classes cannot guarantee a convincing treatment of 
infinite unities (including infinite numbers); this can only be done by the spatial and temporal 
intuition (see Dummett 1981, p. 663). As it has been shown elsewhere (see Milkov 1999), 
Frege‘s change of heart was also helped by the fact that his logic was crypto-intuitive from 
the very beginning. In fact, his foremost preconception was that logical objects can be 
grasped and operated only via geometrical intuition. 
 
8. Epilogue 
 Russell was a revolutionary philosopher who aimed at suggesting a clear programme to 
radically reform the philosophy of his time. In particular, he was convinced that the new 
techniques introduced in mathematics and mathematical logic can finally solve many obscure 
philosophical paradoxes. This was the gist of his ‗scientific method in philosophy‘ which was 
to replace the dialectical method of the British Neo-Hegelians.
27
  
 
26
 Stevens (2005, p. 79). 
27
 It was also to replace the dialectical method of the British Neo-Lotzeans (see Milkov 2008). 
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 The literature on Russell has so far mainly discussed the ways in which he abandoned the 
method of the Neo-Hegelians after he embraced his scientific method of analysis. The present 
paper follows another direction. Since Russell formed his philosophical intuitions in the con-
text of German Learning, he cannot escape being influenced with Hegelian topics as well. 
This is true, in particular, about the problem how units (totalities) relate to their constituents, 
which was the central topic of Hegel‘s logic. Exactly this subject-matter gave also rise to 
Russell‘s paradox.  
 The conclusion we reached in this paper is that the elimination of classes, relations, propo-
sitional functions, and propositions from Russell‘s ontology was more efficient in solving the 
paradox of classes than the official device introduced for this purpose—his Ramified Theory 
of Types. In particular, Russell‘s eliminative programme banished the many-levelled ontolo-
gy he was prone to follow after its 1900 turn, which, in many ways, hampered his method of 
analysis. 
Unfortunately, Russell did not clearly realise that his paradox emerged in connection with 
the problem of constructing unities (totalities) from individuals (objects, terms). That is why 
he never considered the solution of his paradox in the wake later followed by Leśniewski and 
Gödel.  
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